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ABSTRACT.  The present paper provides compendious and thorough solutions to the price equi- 
librium existence problem, the second welfare theorem, and the limit theorem on the core of  an 
economy for exchange economies whose commodity space is an arbitrary ordered Frkchet space. 
The motivation comes from economic applications showing the need to bring within the scope 
of  equilibrium theory commodity spaces that are not vector lattice ordered and whose positive 
cones have  empty interior,  a typical  situation in  models of  portfolio  trading with incomplete 
markets.  Our assumptions are made on the primitive objects of the economy.  Remarkably, the 
assumptions  that we  make on the order structure of  the commodity space are indispensable. 
For w-proper economies, these assumptions are both sufficient and necessary for the existence of 
equilibrium, the second welfare theorem, and the Edgeworth-Walras  equivalence theorem. We 
take advantage of  new developments in the theory of ordered  vector spaces, in particular the 
possibility of  embedding the price cone into a lattice cone called the super-order dual of  the or- 
dered vector space.  Therefore, even though the commodity price duality has no lattice structure 
important lattice theoretic techniques can be applied outside this duality. 
KEYWORDS:  Linear  and non-linear  prices,  ordered  R-kchet space; proper  economies; portfolio 
trading; incomplete  markets; valuation  equilibrium; Walrasian  equilibrium; welfare theorems; 
Edgeworth equilibrium; super order dual; linear programming; convex programming; operations 
research 
The second half of  the twentieth century saw an explosion of  interest in the Walrasian model  , 
of general equilibrium,  Of  the many fundamental results that have been established three are 
foundational:  the existence of at  least one competitive equilibrium, the characterization of valuation 
equilibria as efficient allocations, and the characterization of  competitive equilibria as Edgeworth 
equilibria. 
These important results provide conceptual foundations for our understanding of  efficiency and 
welfare economics. Moreover, all applied economic policy analysis relies implicitly on the founda- 
tions provided by general equilibrium theory. Unfortunately, at present general equilibrium theory 
does not provide an adequate understanding of  economies in many settings,  As  a consequence, 
policy analysis in many important areas (e.g., financial markets) rests on shaky foundations. 
For several decades a primary research program in general equilibrium theory has been to estab- 
lish the classical theorems on price decentralization and the price equilibrium existence problem in 
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a context sufficiently general to encompass as particular instances the important general equilib- 
rium models which arise in applications. This program was well articulated by Mas-Cole11 [27]. The 
idea is to separate the very difficult mathematical problems associated with price decentralization 
from their applications. 
The principal contributors to this program are, of  course, Mas-Cole11 [27] and Mas-Cole11 and 
Richard  [28]. In those papers the authors replace the pervasive finite dimensional assumption on 
the interiority of endowments in consumption sets with two requirements: 
(1) The commodity space be ordered by a vector lattice ordering that is "compatible" with the 
topology of  the space and that constrains and motivates traders-the  traders' consumption 
sets coincide with the positive cone of  this ordering and preferences are monotone with 
respect to this ordering. 
(2) That preferences satisfy an assumption termed w-uniform properness (where w is the to- 
tal endowment of resources), which is  a cone condition  that could  in some settings be 
interpreted as a bound on the marginal rates of  substitution. 
The work of  Mas-Cole11 [27] was extended in [3, 4, 14, 15, 36, 371  and the work of  Mas-Cole11 and 
Richard [28] was extended in [18,20,30,31,34,35].  In all these papers some variant of  w-properness 
is assumed and the lattice theoretic arguments are used in a non-trivial  way,  However, the use 
of  lattice theoretic techniques comes at a price:  the very structure of  the economy is expressed 
in terms of  the vector lattice ordering of the commodity space.  For instance, the constraints on 
consumption sets, the notion of monotone preferences, the properness assumptions, free disposal, 
the notion of  a free disposal equilibrium,  the topology of  the commodity space, and even  the 
compactness  assumptions on  the set of  feasible allocations  are all defined  with respect  to the 
vector lattice ordering of  the commodity space. Therefore, the economic meaning of  these results 
hinges on the the interpretive efficacy of  the ordering of  the space. 
Commodity spaces that are not lattice ordered arise naturally in many economic models and 
the large literature on price decentralization  in vector lattices has little, that is obvious, to say 
in such a setting.  An example of  such an economic model is portfolio trading when markets are 
incomplete.  It is known that in such models all the decentralization results can fail even if  the 
preferences are uniformly proper and the commodity space is finite dimensional, In these models 
consumers are motivated by the payoff of  a portfolio.  Therefore, the meaningful natural ordering 
of  the portfolio space is the one that compares portfolio payoffs and which is closely related to 
the notion of  first order stochastic domination.  In fact, the notion of  arbitrage free prices is an 
order theoretic notion that induces this natural ordering of  the portfolio space. Unfortunately, this 
ordering is rarely a vector lattice ordering when markets are not complete. The basic intuition for 
this is the following. Generally, when markets are not complete some call and put options cannot 
be replicated as the payoff of  a portfolio of  available securities. However, call and put options are 
closely related to the order structure of  the portfolio space.  Indeed, every marketed option is a 
lattice operation in the portfolio space and every lattice operation in the portfolio space is related 
to what is termed in the finance literature a minimum-cost super replicating portfolio of  a call or 
put option (which need not exist). 
Can we  extend the existing results on price decentralization and the price equilibrium existence 
problem  to ordered commodity spaces that are not vector lattices?  We  have the following four 
pointers: 
(a) It is known that when the commodity space is an Archimedean ordered vector lattice the 
price decentralization results hold true but with possibly discontinuous prices.  Jones [23] PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  3 
and Aliprantis and Burkinshaw [8] show that if the commodity space is a vector lattice, 
then to ensure that the decentralizing prices are continuous we  need some lattice structure 
on the space of  continuous prices. 
(b) In the very general context where the commodity space is an ordered vector space that 
need not be a vector lattice, Aliprantis-Tourky-Yannelis  [12] introduced an alternate value 
theory that arises from a personalized pricing system which induces a possibly non-linear 
value function. The classical price decentralization problems are solved by means of these 
non-linear value functions. 
(c) Aliprantis-Monteiro-Tourky  [9] give an example of a uniformly proper model of portfolio 
trading, with three securities and two traders (i.e., with a three dimensional commodity 
space), whose portfolio space is not lattice ordered and in which all the decentralization 
theorems fail for linear prices. In that example, optimal allocations can be supported by 
the Aliprantis-Tourky-Yannelis  non-linear prices. 
(d) Aliprantis and Tourky [lo]  show that the dual cone of  every ordered topological vector space 
can be embedded in a larger lattice ordered cone that contains non-linear functionals, which 
they term the super order dual  of the ordered vector space.  Crucially, this embedding 
preserves lattice operations.  By means of  this embedding, they show that many of  the 
useful structures of  vector lattices have analogues in general ordered vector space settings. 
That is, ordered vector spaces are basically not so different from vector lattices. 
Our purpose in this paper is to provide a thorough solution to the (linear) price decentralization 
and equilibrium existence problems in commodity spaces that are ordered F'rkhet spaces, which 
includes the important class of  ordered Banach spaces.  The paper affords both necessary and 
sufficient conditions for linear price decentralization. 
We deal with well behaved exchange economies that we  call w-proper economies, which include 
the class of w-uniformly proper  economies.  We  show that the linear decentralization of  Pareto 
optimal allocations and Edgeworth equilibria as well as the existence of  a linear price equilibrium 
are all bmically equivalent to the properness of functionals in the super-order dual of  the commodity 
space. More precisely, we  consider the embedding of  the dual cone of  the commodity space in the 
in the super order dual, which is a lattice.  Then we  denote by P the semi-lattice generated by 
the cone of positive linear  prices and call P  our  price  space.  Each possibly non-linear price p 
in P  can be written as  the supremum p  = Vz, fi, where f~,  .  . . ,  fm are positive linear prices. 
Now  each function p in P is a concave function defined on the positive cone of  the commodity 
space. Therefore, the standard properness notions can be defined for these functions like any utility 
function, Surprisingly, it turns out that if  each price in F  satisfies a properness assumption, then 
the following hold true. 
(1)  The second welfare theorem holds, i.e., Pareto optimal allocations can be decentralized as 
(linear) Walrasian valuation equilibria. 
(2) The limit  theorem on the core holds,  i.e.,  Edgeworth  equilibria  are (linear) Walrasian 
equilibria. 
(3) With the standard compactness assumptions, there exists a (linear) Walrasian equilibrium. 
The second major set of results of  the paper shows that these same properness  assumptions 
on the price space F  are also necessary conditions for linear decentralization and the existence of 
equilibria. 
The linear price decentralization theorems enumerated above afford positive results in a host of 
infinite dimensional settings that are not vector lattice ordered.  We  note that the w-properness PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  4 
of  prices in P depends on the order structure of  the commodity space and the "location" of  the 
total endowment of  resources,  Furthermore, it is relatively easy to check if  a price p = Vzl  fi 
satisfies our properness assumption.  Indeed, in a large class of  settings properness is equivalent to 
the existence of  a solution to the following convex programming problem: 
min g(w)  subject to :  g is linear asid g 2 fl,  .  . .  , f, 
In the finance framework this minimization problem translates into the following linear minimiza- 
tion problem: 
min g(T(w)) subject to:  T'(g) 2 fi  for all  i =  1, . .  .  ,  m , 
where each fi is an arbitrage free securities price, T is a portfolio returns operator that associates 
with  each portfolio  a  state contingent  claim,  and T'  is the adjoint  of  T that  associates with 
each Arrow-Debreu  price a securities price. This second minimization problem is a variant of  the 
canonical linear minimization  problem and is the subject of much investigation in the mathematical 
literature on linear programming and operations research. 
The main surprise of  the analysis in the present paper is that the theory of  value with linear 
prices can be articulated  in terms of the cone conditions ubiquitously  called properness in the 
economics literature.  That is, the main  contribution in the literature that follows the work of 
Mas-Cole11  [27] is the application of  cone conditions to the primitive data of  the economy rather 
than the application of  lattice theoretic ideas to general equilibrium analysis. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the study in the paper by introducing an 
abstract framework of  portfolio trading with incomplete markets. Our analysis begins in Section 3. 
The main results of  the paper are contained in Sections 4 and 5. We  return to financial models in 
the last section of  the paper and apply our results. 
The purpose of  this section is to introduce a very general securities model that includes as special 
cases many of  the securities models studied in the literature.  Our approach will be an operator 
theoretic study that is closely related to the setup of  R. A. Jarrow, X. Jin, and D. B. Madan [22] 
and V. Galvani 1211.  For a study of  positive operators see the monographs [l,  71.  We  refer the 
reader to the next section of  this paper for definitions concerning ordered vector spaces. 
Let us  summarize the basic framework.  In a typical finance model one begins with a pair of 
function  spaces L and X, where L  is the portfolio space and X  is the space of  all contingent 
claims, together with a portfolio returns operator R:  L  -+  X that satisfies the following two 
properties, 
R1:  There are no redundant securities (that is, R is one-to-one) and R is positive. 
R2:  The operator R pulls  back  order intervals of R(L)  to closed and bounded subsets of L. 
The operator R:  L  -+  X  reorders  the portfolio space L according to the ordering of  X.  This 
new ordering of  the portfolio space is called the portfolio dominance ordering (a notion introduced 
in [5]),  which in general is not a vector lattice ordering even if X is a vector lattice. Portfolio traders 
are motivated and constrained by this new ordering rather than the canonical ordering of  L, which 
is basically redundant.  Crucially, the arbitrage freeness of  securities prices is relative to this new 
generally non-lattice portfolio dominance ordering. Some important examples of  portfolio returns 
operators are provided by embeddings R:  L ct X. That is, when R(L)  is closed or, equivalently, 
when R is bounded below, i.e., there exists some constant c > 0 such that llR8)(  2 clldll  holds for 
all 8 E  L;  see (1,  Theorem 2.51. PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  5 
In a two period model the Banach lattice X could be for instance one of  the following: 
(a) The Banach lattice X = L2(S,  C, n) of  all square integrable functions on S,  where (S,  C, n) 
is a probability space representing period one uncertainty. 
(b) Given a compact topological space S representing the states of the world tomorrow, the 
Banach lattice X =  C(S)  of  all continuous functions on S, 
(c) Any of  the Banach lattice commodity spaces from the existing literature. 
In a continuous time model, we  are given a probability space (S,C,  n) and an interval T 2 R+ 
such that the space X is the space of  all stochastic processes of  the form f  (t,  s), which are square 
integrable functions from T to L2(S,  C, n). 
Two examples in the finance literature of  portfolio spaces are as follows. 
(a) In a two-period model the available securities are indexed by  a positive a-finite measure 
space (3,  F,  p). The portfolio space is the Banach space L = Lz(J, F, p). A portfolio is 
any vector in the portfolio space L. 
(b) En  a continuous time model where T is a subinterval of R, the space of  portfolios is the 
space of  portfolio processes from T to L2(,7,F,  p).  For  more on portfolio processes we 
refer the reader to [24]. 
Two important examples of  assets returns operators are presented next. 
(1) When there are finitely many states of  the world and finitely many available securities the 
assets returns operator R is simply a non-negative matrix whose columns delineate the 
available non-redundant assets. For more on this example see for instance [26J and [32]. 
(2) In the case the portfolio space is the Banach function space L = L2(,7,3,  p) = La(,7) and 
the space of  contingent claims is X = Lz  (8,  C,  n) = L2 (S),  R is an  integral operator. Here, 
the payoff of  a security j  at state s is  denoted P(j,  s). The function P: J  x S -+  R+  is 
called the assets returns kernel, which is assumed to be p x n-measurable. We  assume 
that for each portfolio 0 E L the function j  t-, P(j,  s)8(j) is p-integrable for n-almost all 
s E S. Moreover, the payoff IRO](s) of  a portfolio 0 for n-almost all states of  the world  s 
is given by 
[R~I(s)  =  PO,  s)~(j)dp(j)  . 
We assume that the range of  the operator R lies in L2(S), Therefore, R defines an integral 
linear operator from the portfolio space L2(,7) to the contingent claims space L2(S). In 
this case, notice that this operator is positive if  and only if  the assets returns kernel is 
non-negative. 
In (2) above it is not always true that the portfolio returns operator R pulls back order intervals 
of  R(L) to closed and bounded subsets of  L. However, an example of  a portfolio returns operator 
that pulls back order intervals of  R(L) to closed and bounded subsets of  L will be presented in 
Section 6, 
Let us formalize the general framework.  We  are given a Banach lattice X that represents the 
space of  all real (possibly multiperiod) contingent claims.  A vector in X is called a contingent 
claim. The positive cone of  this space is X+ and, as usual, a consumer's consumption decision is 
restricted to this cone.  Agents trade portfolios of  available securities that pay contingent claims 
in X. They choose a portfolio which is a vector in a given Banach lattice L called the portfolio 
space. The payoffs of  portfolios are given by  means of  the portfolio returns operator R: L -+ X. 
So, the payoff of  a portfolio 8 E L is R(0) E X or simply Re. PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  6 
A  contingent claim  x  L:  X  is  said to be  marketed if  there exists  a  portfolio  8  E  L such 
that Re = x.  The vector subspace of all marketed contingent claims is denoted M, and clearly, 
M = R(L),  the range of  R.  We  say that the market is complete if M  = X, where M  denotes 
the closure of  M.  If M  # X,  then the market is incomplete. 
The portfolio returns operator induces a new ordering 2 on the portfolio space L as follows: 
827 (j  ROLRq. 
This ordering is termed portfolio dominance, Denote the positive cone of  this ordering of  the 
portfolio space by L+ = (8 E L:  Re 2 O}, which is in general different from the canonical positive 
cone of the portfolio space L. 
From now on when we  talk about the ordering of  the portfolio space we  are referring to the 
portfolio dominance ordering. 
The portfolio space under this ordering fits perfectly into the analysis in the sequel. 
Lemma 1.  Under portfolio  dominance  the portfolio  space  is an ordered  Banach  space  with a 
generating positive  cone and bounded  order intervals. V L is reflexive or if M  is closed and X  has 
an order continuous norm, then order intervals in the portfolio  space  are weakly  compact. 
Proof.  Notice first that the portfolio cone is generating since it contains the original positive cone 
of L, which is generating. Moreover, L+ = R"(X+)  is closed. 
If L is reflexive, then the dominance order intervals of  L are closed and bounded by assumption, 
and hence they are weakly  compact.  When M is closed, then by  the open mapping theorem 
the operator R: L  -+  M is a topological and order isomorphism.  Moreover, since X  has order 
continuous norm the order intervals of  X are weakly compact and so are the order intervals of  M. 
By the continuity of  RU1 : M -+ L it follows that the dominance order intervals of  L are likewise 
weakly compact. 
Notice that commodity spaces that are Banach lattices with order continuous norms are ubiq- 
uitous in modern general equilibrium analysis, 
Clearly, if M = X,  then portfolio dominance is a vector lattice ordering.  This is so since the 
portfolio  returns operator is surjective and therefore it reorders the portfolio  space in a vector 
lattice manner. However, if the market is incomplete, then portfolio dominance is unlikely to be a 
vector lattice ordering, In fact, one can characterize the very rare situations in which this ordering 
is a vector lattice ordering. 
For any set Y in the space of contingent claims let R(Y) be the Riesz subspace of X generated 
by Y, i.e., R(Y)  is the smallest Riesz subspace containing Y. 
Lemma 2.  Portfolio  dominance is a vector lattice  ordering  if  and  only if  there ezists a positive 
projection  from R(M)  to R(M)  whose range is the marketed space  M. 
Proof, Clearly, portfolio dominance is a vector lattice ordering if  and only if  M is a Riesz space 
under its canonical ordering as a subspace of  X. But by  Miyajima's result [I,  Theorem 5.641 this 
is the case if and only if  there exists a positive projection1 from R(M)  to R(M),  I 
The lattice operations in the portfolio space are closely related to the presence of marketed call 
options. Recall, that a contingent claim x E X is called marketed if there exists a portfolio 0 E L 
satisfying RO  = x. Now take a portfolio 19 and a strike price k E X. Assume that k is marketed and 
An operator T: V  -+  V on a vector space is called a projection  if T2 = T. If  V is an ordered vector space a 
projection that is also a positive operator is called a positive projection. PRICE  DECENTRALIZATION  7 
let K  E L satisfy RK  =  k. The call option on the portfolio 6'  with strike price k is the contingent 
claim [RB -  k]+ = (Re -  k) V 0 E X. The call option is non-trivial if  neither RB > k nor R0  5 k 
hold.  If  such an option is marketed, then the supremum [B -  K]+ = (0 -  K)  V 0 exists in L for the 
portfolio dominance ordering and R[6' -  K]~  = [RB -  k]+. 
In other words, a call option is a vector lattice operation in X and if  it is marketed, then it is 
replicated by  a vector lattice operation in L.  So, the marketability  of  call options transfers the 
lattice structure of  X to L.  However, we  know the following results from the finite dimensional 
setting. 
Lemma 3.  Suppose that there are  J  finitely  many nominal securities and S finitely  many states 
of  the world,  Let  @  be  the space  of all  assets returns matrices for which the bond 1 is marketed. 
The following  results hold  true: 
(1) Generically in $J  the market is complete if  and  only if  all call options are marketed. 
(2)  If  J  5 $(S  + I), then generically in Q,  no non-trivial call option is marketed. 
Proof.  For  (1) see [32] and for (2) see [ll.]. 
Finally for this section, let us define the notion of arbitrage free securities prices.  A securities 
price is simply a continuous linear functional on the portfolio space. Therefore, the dual space Lt 
is called the space of  securities prices. A securities price p is weakly arbitrage free if for any 
portfolio B E L+  (i.e., R6'  E X+) we  have p(6') 2 0.  A securities price p is arbitrage free if for 
any non-zero portfolio 6'  E L+  \ (0)  we  have p(B) > 0.  Therefore, arbitrage freeness is defined in 
terms of  the portfolio dominance ordering of L. 
In fact, portfolio dominance induces an ordering on the space of  securities prices as follows: 
p > q if  p(B) 2  q(0) for all 6'  E L+.  This ordering is a vector ordering that makes L'  an ordered 
Banach space. As usual denote by  L;  the positive cone of  L'. That is, L;  =:  {  f  E L' : f 2 0). 
Lemma 4.  A  securitaes price p is weakly arbitrage free  if and  only if p E L!+.  It is arbitrage free 
if  and  only if it is a strictly positive  linear functional  (i.e., p >  0). 
In this section we  introduce the commodity space, the price space, proper economies, and the 
various notions of  equilibria.  For  technical details not covered in this paper, we  refer the reader 
to the following monographs.  For general infinite dimensional analysis see [2], For  the theory of 
ordered topological vector spaces see [29, 331.  For vector lattices see [6, 251.  We  shall extensively 
use results obtained in [lo] regarding the super order dual of  an ordered vector space. 
THE  COMMODITY  SPACE  is an ordered F'rkchet space L with a closed and generating positive cone 
whose order intervals are topologically bounded.  That is: 
(a) L is a topological vector space endowed with a complete metrizable locally convex topol- 
ogy 7. 
(b) L is equipped with an order relation > such that x2y imply ax  +  z>ay +  2 for all 2eL 
and all scalars aZO. 
(c) The positive cone L+ = {x  E L : x 2  0)  is closed and generating, i.e., L+ -  L+ =  L, 
(d) Each order interval  [0,  x] = (y E L+ : 0 5 y 5 x) is T-bounded. 
The topological dual of  (L,r)  is  denoted L'.  It is also an ordered vector space under  its 
canonical ordering, i.e., f 2 g if  f (x) > g(x)  for all x E L+. We  shall require that at least one of PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  8 
Mas-Colell's [27] quasi-concave uniformly proper functions that is also strictly monotone exists, or 
equivalently: 
There exists a strictly positive linear functional f E L', i.e., f (x) > 0 for all x > 0. 
The dual of our commodity space is well behaved. 
Lemma 5. Evey positive linear functional is continuous and the cone L$  is generatinge2 
If the least upper bound (supremum) (resp. the greatest lower bound (infimum)) of a 
subset S of an  ordered space exists, then it may be denoted sup S or Vzl xi when S = {XI,.  .  . ,  x,} 
or x V y when S = {x,  Y)  (resp. inf S or A:,  xi or x A  y). As usual, we shall say that L is a Riesz 
space (or a vector lattice) if  x V y and x A  y exist in L for all x,  y€L. 
THE  PRICE  SPACE  will be a semi-lattice of  the super order dual of  L+.  We  begin  with a few 
definitions.  We  say that a function f:  L+  -+  E%  is positive if  f (x) 2 0 holds for each x  E L+; 
is super-additive, if  f (x) + f (y) < f (x +  y)  holds for all x, y  E  L+; additive if  f (x + y) = 
f (x) +  f (y) holds for all x,  y E  L+; and is positively homogeneous, if  f (ax) = a  f (x) holds for 
every a > 0 and all  x E L+. 
The price space will be a subset of  the following collection of  real-valued non-negative functions 
on L+  given by 
II = {f  6  E%?  :  f  is super-additive and positively homogeneous). 
It should be noticed that every function f  E II is monotone in the sense that 0 5 x 5 y implies 
0 = f (0) 5 f (x) 5 f (y).  Clearly, IT  is a cone of  IRL+ . The cone IT  is called the super order 
dual cone of  L+  and was introduced and studied in detail in  [lo].  Notice  that II inherits the 
natural pointwise order of  EXL+.  In other words, for f,  g: L+  -+  IW we write f  > g (and say that f 
dominates g) whenever f (x) > g(x) holds for each x E L+. 
The important result for us here is that the cone I1  is a lattice even though L may not be a 
vector lattice; see 110, Corollary 4.41. 
Theorem 6.  The super order dual cone ll  with  its natural ordering  is a lattice.  Moreover,  the 
supremum operation for any pair fl, fi  E Il and any x E L+  is given  by 
[fl  f21(~)  =  su~{fi(~l)  +  fa(y2) : yl,  ya  E L+  and yl +  y2 = x). 
The dual cone L;  can be viewed as a subcone of  the cone IT, In particular, throughout our 
discussion we  shall use the following simple but very useful result, whose proof follows from the 
Kantorovich extension theorem; see for instance [I,  Theorem 1.151. 
Lemma 7.  The positive linear functionals on L are precisely the extensions of  the additive func- 
tions in IT. So,  we can write Lit = {f  E IT:  f is additive). 
As a matter of  fact, there is a natural embedding J:  Lit  -+ IT defined by 
for all x  6 L+.  This embedding is clearly one-to-one  and monotone.  In addition, we  have the 
following remarkable result proved in [lo,  Theorem 5.51. 
2From [lo, Theorem 7.21 we know that L'  = L'  = L"  where L'  is the order regular dual of  L  comprising of 
linear functionals that can be written  as differences of  positive linear functionals and L"  is the order dual of  L 
consisting of all order bounded linear functionals on L. PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  9 
Theorem 8 (Aliprantis-Tourky).  Assume that the order intervals of L are weakly compact.  If  the 
supremum Vyl-,  f,  of  the positive  continuous linear functionals fi,  . . .  ,  fn on L exasts in L', then 
J($  fi) = $  ~(fi) 
i= 1  i= 1 
holds in II. That is, the embedding J:  Lit  -+  II preserves finite  suprema. 
Let us  say that a non-empty subset of  a lattice is  a semi-lattice if  it is  closed under finite 
suprema. Every non-empty subset A of  a lattice is included in a smallest semi-lattice U(A), called 
the semi-lattice generated by A, Clearly, U(A) consists of  all finite suprema of  the set A. With 
this definition in mind, we  are now ready to define our price space. 
Definition 9.  The price space P is the semi-lattice U(Lk),  i.e., P  consists of all finite  suprema 
of L;  in the super dual  cone II. 
The pair (L,  P)  will be our commodity-price duality. In the special case of a Etiesz commodity 
space, i.e., when L is a FrCchet lattice, the price space P  coincides with the positive cone of  L'  and 
we  regain the standard commodity-price duality in the literature.  We  have the following result 
concerning the price space P. 
Lemma  10.  If P = L;,  then L'  is a  Riesz space.  Conversely, P = Lit  whenever one of  the 
following  conditions holds true: 
(1) L is a Riesz space. 
(2) L has the Riesz decomposition property,  i.e.,  [0,  x] +  [0,  y] = 10, x+y] holds for  all x,  y E L+. 
(3) L is a Banach space and L'  is a Riesz space  in its own right. 
(4) The order intervals of L are weakly  compact and L'  is a Riesz space in its own right.' 
Proof.  First suppose that P = L;.  Fix f  E L'.  Since L'  = LT holds, it follows that there exists 
some g E L;  satisfying -g  < f . By our assumption (f +  g) V g -- g +  f  V 0 exits in P =  L;,  This 
implies that f V 0 exists in L', Therefore L'  is a Riesz space. 
The proofs of  (1)-(4) follow from the fact that in those settings for any fl,  f2  E L;  and for any 
s  E L+  the supremum is given by the Riesz-Kantorovich  formula: 
[flvfi](~)  =  SUP{~~(YI)+~~(Y~):  Y1,~2  EL+ and yl+yz=x), 
in both L'  and in II. See 1131  for (3) and [lo] for (4).  1 
Each price in P  can be written as the supremum Vrll f, of linear functions fl, .  . . ,  fn in L;. 
So, from now  on, V;=,  fi shall be understood to be the price in P  which is the supremum of the 
linear functions fl,  .  . .  ,  fn E  Lk. 
Perhaps we  can appreciate why in general the suprema in P  are not additive by looking at the 
special case of a three dimensional commodity space. The half-ray of  the cone L+  determined by 
a vector x E L+  is the set L,  = {ax:  o 2 0).  A half-ray L,  of  L+  is called an extremal ray 
of  the cone L+ if  for each YEL, we  have [O, y] = {dy: 0 5 6 < 1). The following result is easy to 
prove; see [lo]. 
3~e  note that every Riesz space has the Riesz decomposition property, but not every space that has the Riesz 
decomposition property is a Riesz space.  The following is a open question in the mathematical literature:  Does 
there exist opt  ordered  vector space  that does not have the Riesz decomposition property  and whose regular  dual Lr 
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Lemma 11.  Let  L  be  a  three  dimensional  vector  space.  There exist  at  least  one  pair  of  non- 
comparable linear functional~  f,  g  E Lk such that the function  f  V g  E P is additive if  and  only  if 
L+ has at  most four extremal rays. 
Domination in 'P  is characterized as follows; for a proof see [lo, Lemma 3.71. 
Lemma 12 (Aliprantis-Tourky).  Assume  that  f,  g  E P.  If f (xo) > 0 holds for some  xo  E L+, 
then the following  statements are  equivalent. 
(1)  The function  g  dominates f, i.e., g(y) > f  (y) holds for  each y E  L+. 
(2)  For  each y E L+ satishing f(y) = f  (xo) we  have  g(y) > f(xo). 
THE  ECONOMY  has m consumers designated by the index i = 1,.  . .  ,  m.  As usual, the consumption 
set  of  consumer i is L+.  The bundle  w,  > O  is the ith consumer's initial endowment and 
m  w = C,=,  wi is the total endowment, 
The correspondence Pi: L+ ts.  L+ denotes the ith consumer's (strict) preferences.  We  assume 
that each mapping P,  satisfies the standard assumptions. That is, Pi is irreflexive, i.e., x $ Pi(x) 
for each x E  L+; is strictly monotone, i.e., x+y E P,(x) for each y > O;  is convex-valued; has 
open values in L+ for some linear topology on L; and is w-proper in the sense of  Tourky [34]: 
There exists another convex-valued correspondence pt : L+ ts.  L such that for each x E L+: 
(a)  The vector x +  w  is an interior point of  E(x). 
(b) ?i(x) n  L+ = P,(x). 
An exchange economy with commodity-price duality (L, P)  and with the above characteristics 
will  be referred to as a proper economy.  We  will  say that the economy is compact if  order 
intervals of  L are weakly compact and preferences have weakly open lower sections, that is, for 
each bundle y E L+ the lower section PF'(~) = {x E L+:  y E pi(%))  is weakly open in L+. 
For any x E  L+ let A,  = {y  E Ly  : Czl  y( = x).  As  usually, (XI,.  . . ,  xm)  E $1,  is said to be 
an allocation. In our general setting, we  say that endowments are decomposable if 
This is a very natural assumption in economics, It means that each allocation can be viewed as the 
outcome of  bilateral trading.  Notice that in the presence of  the Riesz decomposition property this 
condition is always true. However, this equality can be true for some choices of  initial endowments 
in any ordered vector space, 
Definition 13. For  a given commodity space L and  any fixed  w > O,  we  shall  denote the collection 
of all proper  economies with commodity-price duality  (L,  P)  and  total  endowment w  by E(L,  w). 
The collection of economies in E(L, w)  for which the endowments are  decomposable will  be denoted 
ED (L, w) . 
The next result informs us that we  are not working with an empty set of  economies. 
Lemma 14. For  any  commodity  space L  and  any  fixed  w  > 0 the  collection  of  all  decompos- 
able  economies  &n(L,w) t  &(L,  w)  is non-empty and  contains economies  with arbitrarily many 
consumers. Further, if  L has the Riesz decomposition property,  then &(L,  w) =  &*(L, w). 
Proof. To see that ED(L,  w)  is non-empty, let wi = $w  and assume that every consumer i has the 
utility function ui(x) = f (x), where f  E L'  is a strictly positive linear functional.  W 
Let us  introduce the standard notions of  efficiency.  An  allocation  (xl,.  . . ,  x,)  is  said to be 
weakly Pareto optimal, if  there is no allocation (yl,. . . ,  y,)  satisfying yi  E P(xi)  for each i E I; PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  11 
a core allocation, if it cannot be blocked by any allocation in the sense that there is no allocation 
(y1,  . .  . ,  ym) and a coalition S such that 
(a) CzES  9%  = CiES  W~7  and 
(b) y,  E Pz(x,)  for all i E S; 
an Edgeworth equilibrium, if it belongs to the core of  every r-fold replica economy.* 
A PRICE  EQUILIBRIUM  in this paper is the generalization in [12J  of the standard notion of Walrasian 
equilibrium to the case of the extended commodity price duality {L,  Pj. 
Definition 15. An allocation (XI,. . . ,  x,)  is said  to be: 
(1) A valuation equilibrium, if  there exists some price  p E P  (called a supporting price) 
such that: 
(a)  y E  Pi(zi) implies  p(y) > p(zi), and 
(b) the arbitrage-free condition  0 <  p(w)  _< Czl   xi) holds. 
(2) An equilibrium, if  there exists some some price p  E F (again called a supporting price) 
such that: 
(a) p(w) > 0, 
(b) 9  E Pi(%{)  implies p(y) > p(xi), and 
(c) for each  (01,. . . ,  a,)  E ]W?  we  have p(Czn=,  a2u1.)  5 Czl  Q~P(x~)+ 
(3) A personalized  equilibrium (resp. a personalized  valuation equilibrium),  whenever 
it is an equilibrium (resp. a valuation equilibrium) with respect to some supporting price  of 
the form  p = Vzl  fi with fi E  L!+ for each  i that satisfies  p(w) = CEl  fi(x,). 
(4) A  Walrasian equilibrium (resp. a Walrasian valuation  equilibrium), if  it  is  an 
equilibrium (resp. a valuation equilibrium) with an additive supporting price  in F. 
Notice that condition (b) of  part (1)  of the above definition is equivalent to: 
m. 
i=l 
In view of Lemma 7 it is easy to see that our definition of a Walrasian equilibrium coincides with 
the standard definition in the literature. The following theorem, established in [12,  Theorems 5.1 
and 7.5 & Lemma 6.31, is the basic result in the literature regarding the decentralization of  efficient 
allocations by non-linear prices, 
Theorem 16 (Aliprantis-Tourky-Yannelis).  For  a proper  economy the following  hold  true: 
(1) An allocation is weakly Pareto optimal if  and only if it is a valuation equilibrium, 
(2) An allocation is an  Edgeworth  equilibrium if  and  only if  it is an  equilibrium. 
(3) Every  equilibrium is  a personalized  equilibrium and  every  valuation equilibrium is a per- 
sonalized  valuation equilibrium. 
(4) If  the economy is compact, then there exists an equilibrium. 
We also have the following companion to Theorem 16 that was obtained in [9]. 
Theorem 17.  There exists a compact proper  economy  in which an  equilibrium with a non-linear 
price  exists but  no  Walrasian equilibrium with  (continuous or  discontinuous) linear prices  exists, 
and  Pareto  optimal  allocations  that  are  supported  as  equilibria  by non-linear prices  but  not  as 
Walrasian valuation equilibria with linear prices. 
 h he notion of  Edgeworth  equilibrium was  introduced in [3] and was inspired by the notion of  the strict core 
of G. Debreu and H. E  Scarf [17]. It was  shown in [19] that Edgeworth equilibria exist in compact economies PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  12 
In this section we  look at sufficient conditions on  the order structure of  the space that will 
guarantee the supportability of  optimal allocations by linear prices.  But first, let us recall some 
notions of properness for functions on L+. 
Definition 18.  We  say that a junction f:  L+ -t I&  is: 
(1) w-proper at some y  E  L+, if  there exists a convex set F such that: 
(a)  y +  w is an interior point  of F,  and 
(b) FnL+={zEL+: f(z)  >f(~))a 
(2) Pointwise proper at w, if  there exists an open wedge"  such that: 
(a)  (W -  n  L+ # @,  and 
(b) (w-r)n{~~  L+:  f(x)>  f(w))  =@. 
Some basic properties of  the preceding notions of properness are included in the next result. 
Lemma 19. For a function  f  : L+ -t R  we have the following. 
(1) If  there exists a price  n E  L'+  that supports the set  (z E  L+:  f  (z)  > f  (w))  at w (i.e., 
z E L+  with f  (a)  > f  (w)  implies n(z)  _>  n(w))  and  satisfies n(w)  > 0, then f  is pointwise 
proper  at w. 
(2) A price  p E P  that satisfies p(w) > 0 is pointwise proper  at w if  and  only  if  there exists 
some price n E  LI, such that: 
(a) 4~)  =  dw), 
(b) 7,-  2 P,  and 
(c)  n supports the convex set  {z  E L+ :  p(z) 2 p(w)) at w. 
(3) Iff  is w-proper at w, then f  is pointwise proper  at w. 
Proof.  (1)  Assume that the set  (z  E  L+:  f (z)  > f  (w))  is supported at w by  a price .rr  E  L'+ 
that satisfies n(w) > 0. Now  consider the open wedge I' = {x  E  L: n(x)  > 0)  and note that 
w -  iw  E  (w -  I') n  L+  and that if  some y E  satisfies w -  y E L+  and f  (w -  y) > f  (w),  then 
n(w)  < n(w -  y) or n(y)  _<  0,  which is impossible. Hence, (w -  I?)  n {x E  L+:  f  (x)  > f (w))  =  @, 
and thus f  is pointwise proper at w, 
(2) Assume that I'  is an open wedge such that (w -  I?) n  {z  E  L+:  p(z) > p(w)) = @ and 
(w -  T)  fl  L+  #  @.  By the separation theorem  there exists some non-zero n  E  L'  such that 
n(w -  y) < n(z)  holds for all y € I' and all a E L+  with p(z) > p(w). From p(6w) > p(w) for all 
6 > 1  we get n(w -  y) 5 dn(w)  for all d > 1. This implies n(y)  1  0 for all y E  I?,  and consequently 
n(y)  > 0 for all y E 
To  see that n 2  0 holds fix  z  E  L+  and  note  that for each real  number  6 > 1 we  have 
p(6w + a) > p(w). This implies .rr(w -  y) < 6n(w)  +  n(a)  for all d > 1 and all y E  I', and from 
this it follows that n(z)  2 0,  i.e.,  .rr 2 0.  Next, pick some yl  E  I' with w -  E L+ and note that 
0 5 n(w -  n)  < n(w). Moreover, since p is concave, it should be clear that n supports the set 
(z  E  L+ : p(z) 2 p(w)} at w. If we  replace .rr by  we have n(w)  =  p(w). The fact that .rr 2  p 
follows immediately from Lemma 12. The converse follows immediately from part (1). 
(3)  Assume that f  is w-proper at  w. Pick a convex set F such that 2w in an interior point of  F 
and F n L+ = {a  E  L+:  f  (z) > f (w)). Since w $ {z  E  L+ :  f  (3) > f  (w)),  it follows that w $ F. 
w 
5~n  open wedge I'  is any nonempty open convex set such that ax E I'  for any a > 0 and x E r. 
6  If  ~("1)  = 0  holds for some yo  E I', then pick some circled neighborhood V of zero with yo + V 2 r and note 
that T(TO  +  v)  > 0  implies T(V)  > 0 for a11  v  E  V. The latter shows that T  -- 0,  which is a contradiction. PRICE  DECENTRALIZATION  13 
So, by the separation theorem, there exists some non-zero n E L'  such that ~(w)  < n(x)  for all 
x E F, Since 2w is an interior point of F, it follows that n(w)  > 0.  Now  notice that n supports 
the set {z E L+ :  f  (2)  > f  (a))  at w and use part (1). 
We also have the following useful characterization of  pointwise proper prices. 
Lemma  20. If order intervals of  L are  weakly  compact, then for a price  p of the form p = Vzl  fi 
such that p(w)  > 0 the following statements are  equivalent: 
(1)  The price  p is pointwise  proper  at w, 
(2)  There exists a solution to the following linear minimization problem: 
ming(w)  subject to:  g  E L'  and  g 2 fi  for  all  i = 1,  .  .  . ,  m,  (5) 
Proof.  (1)  ===+  (2)  If p = VZl fi is pointwise proper at w,  then (according to part (2) of Lemma 19) 
there is some n E L!+ with T 2 p and n(w)  =  p(w).  Clearly, n 2  fi for all i and n is a solution to 
the minimization problem (5). 
(2)  ==+  (1)  Let p = VZl fi.  Let r be a solution to the minimization problem  (5).  From 110, 
Theorem 7,6] it follows that p(w) = n(w)  > 0. &om  the fact that n 2 fi for each i we  see that 
n 2 p and (by Lemma 12)  n supports the convex set {y E L+: p(y)  > p(w))  at w,  By part (1)  of 
Lemma 19,  p  is pointwise proper at w. I 
In the next result we  show how pointwise properness of  non-linear prices can guarantee decen- 
tralization by linear prices. 
Lemma 21.  We have the following: 
(1)  A valuation equilibrium supported  by a price  that is poantwise  proper  at  w is a  Walrasian 
valuation equilibrium. 
(2) An equilibrium supported  by a price  that is w-proper at  w is a  Walrasian equilibrium. 
(3) If  the initial endowments are  decomposable, then any equilibrium supported  by a price  that 
is pointwise proper  at  w  is a  Walrasian equilibrium. 
Proof.  (1)  Let (21,  . .  . ,  xm)  be a valuation equilibrium that is supported by a price p E P  which is 
pointwise proper at w. We  can assume that p(w)  = 1.  By part (2) of  Lemma 19 there exists some 
T  E L$ satisfying n(w)  =  p(w)  -- 1  that supports the set {z E LL: p(z) 2 ~(w)}  at w and T > p. 
Now  the relation 
II)  m 
1 =  T(W)  = Cn(xi)  2 CP(X,)  =  p(w)  =  1 
i=l  i= 1 
implies that n(x,) = p(x,)  for each i. It is now  easy to see that n supports the allocation as a 
Walrasian valuation equilibrium. 
(2)  Let  (XI,  . . .  ,x,)  be an equilibrium with a supporting price p E  P  satisfying p(w) = 1. 
Since preferences are strictly monotone and  axi E Pi(%{)  holds for  each a > 1 it follows that 
p(asi)  =  ap(x6)  > P(x<).  This implies that p(xi) > 0 for each i. 
Now  consider the collection of  bundles 
Since CZlp(xi)  = p(w) = 1,  it is easy to see that w E COX. Also, from condition  (c) of  the 
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From the w-properness of  p we  see that there exists some convex set F that contains 2w in its 
interior such that F n L+ = {z  E  L+  : p(z) > 1). Therefore, co X n F = 0.  Let n be a non-zero 
continuous linear functional that separates these two sets, i.e., n(x)  5 n(z)  holds for all x f  COX 
and all z  E  F with p(z) > 1.  Since w E COX  and 2w  is in the interior of  F, we  see that that 
n(2w) > n(w),  which implies that n(w)  > 0, Therefore, we  can assume that n(w) = 1. 
Now  if  z E  L+  satisfies p(z) = p(w) = 1, then dz f F for  all d > 1 and therefore we  have 
p(w) = n(w)  < dn(z)  for all 6 > 1. This implies p(w) 5 n(z),  and consequently from Lemma 12 it 
follows that n >  p.  Therefore, as in part (I),  it must be the case that n supports the allocation as 
a Walrasian valuation equilibrium with n(xa)  = p(xi) for each i.  Furthermore, it should be clear 
that n(&)  5 1 and therefore, n(wi) < p(x;) = n(xi). This implies n(w,) = ~(x,)  and thus n 
supports the allocation as a Walrasian equilibrium. 
(3) Assume that C,"=,  Ai = R, and let  ($1,. . .  ,  x,)  be  an equilibrium,  By  part  (3) of 
Theorem  16  we  know  that (zl,.  .  .  ,  x,)  is  a personalized  equilibrium.  Let  p = Vgl  f,  be  a 
personalized price supporting (XI,.  .  . ,  x,)  with p(w) =  1. We  know that 
Now  from  the decomposability  assumption, it  follows that xcl  p(wi) = p(w) . In particular, 
p(xi) = p(wi) for each 2.  Now  as in  (1) we  can find some n  E  L;  with n(w) = 1 and  n 2 p. 
As  above .rr(xi) -  ~(x~)  and n(w,) =  p(w,), which clearly implies that n is the desired supporting 
linear price. . 
We  continue by introducing the notion of  a proper price space. 
Definition 22.  We  shall say that the price  space P  is: 
(1) w-proper, if each price p E  P  satisfging p(w) > 0 is w-proper at w, and 
(2) pointwise proper at w, if each price p E P  satisfying p(w) > 0 is pointwise  proper  at w. 
J?rom Lemma 19 we know that an w-proper price space P is automatically pointwise proper at  w. 
We  can now turn to the first of  our major results.  Remarkably, as expected from the previous 
discussion, when the price space is proper we regain the classical Walrasian value theory with linear 
prices even outside of  the realm of  vector lattice commodity spaces. 
Theorem 23.  For an w-proper price  space we have the following: 
(I) The notions of  equilibrium,  Walrasian equilibm'um,  and Edgeworth equilibrium coincide. 
(2) If the economy is compact, then there exists a  Walrasian equilibrium. 
Proof. The validity of  the statements follows immediately  from Lemma 21 in  conjunction with 
Theorem 16. . 
There are many interesting examples of  price spaces that are w-proper for which the commodity 
space is not a Riesz space and lacks the Riesz decomposition property.  Moreover, the properness 
of  the price space depends on the position of  w in L+, One can construct even finite dimensional 
examples in which the price space is proper for some positive vectors but not for others. 
We  conclude this section with an analogue of  the preceding theorem for pointwise proper price 
spaces. Its proof is similar and is omitted. 
Theorem 24.  For a price  space that is pointwise proper  at w we have the following: PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  15 
(1) The  notions of  valuation equilibrium,  Walrasian valuation equilibrium,  and  weak  Pareto 
optimality coincide. 
(2)  If  the  initial  endowments are  decomposable,  then the  notions  of  equilibrium,  Walmsian 
equilibrium, and  Edgeworth equilibrium coincide, 
(3)  If  the economy is compact and  the initial endowments are  decomposable,  then there esists 
a  Walmsian equilibrium. 
We have seen that the properness of prices provides sufficient conditions for the decentralization 
of  optimal allocations by linear prices. In this section we show that basically the properness of the 
non-linear prices also affords necessary conditions for linear decentralization. That is, one cannot 
hope to derive the classical Walrasian theory of  value for proper economies unless the prices have 
some properness properties at the total endowment vector. We begin with a definition. 
Definition  25.  For  a price  of  the form  p = VEl  f, with  f,  E  LL for  each  i, we  say  that  an 
allocation x E Aw  is  an  optimizer if  p(w) = ELl  fi(xi).  The allocation x 2s  a non-trivial 
optimizer ifp(w)  > 0 and  xi > 0  for all i. 
We  are ready to establish the equivalence between pointwise proper price spaces and the decen- 
tralization of  Edgeworth equilibria by linear prices. 
Theorem 26. For  the collection ED(L,  w)  of decomposable economies the following  statements are 
equivalent: 
(a) Each price  of  the form  p  = VEl  fi  that has  a  non-trivial optimazer is pointwise  proper 
at  W. 
(b) Every Edgeworth  equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium. 
Proof.  (a) ==+  (b)  Let x = (xl  , . . .  ,  xm)  be an  Edgeworth equilibrium for some economy in ED(L,  w). 
Clearly, x is a non-trivial  allocation. According to Theorem 16,  the allocation x is an equilibrium 
for some price of the form p = VE,  fi  with p(w) > 0 for which x is an optimizer. 
Now,  by  our assumption, p is pointwise proper at w and a glance at part  (3)  of  Lemma  21 
guarantees that x is a Walrasian equilibrium. 
(b) ==+  (a)  Let  a price  of  the form p = Vzl  f, with p(w) > 0 have a non-trivial  optimizer 
x = (al,.  . . ,  x,).  That is, xi > 0 for all i and p(w) = Egl  fz(xi)* 
Fix a strictly positive linear functional h on L  and put gi = f, + h for each i and consider the 
m  price q = Va=l  gz  =  p +  h. We claim that q is pointwise proper at w. 
Clearly,  x = (al,.  . . ,  x,)  is an optimizer  for  q.  That is,  q(w) = CEl  g,(x,) > 0.  From 
q(x,)  2  g,(xi)  and the inequalities 
it follows that gi(xi)  =  q(xa)  holds for all i. 
Next, we  shall define an economy in ED(L,  w)  for which x is an Edgeworth equilibrium. To this 
end, for each i let w,  = ew  > 0 and note that q(wd)  =  g,(s,)  holds for each i. F'urthermore, for 
each trader i = 1,.  . . ,  m let gi be the trader's utility function. Clearly, this economy is in ED(L,  w). 
Since x E  L+ with  g,(x) > gi(xi)  implies  q(x) 2 $,(x) > gi(x,) = q(xi), it follows that  q 
supports x as a valuation equilibrium.  We  need to show that q supports x as an equilibrium.  To PRICE  DECENTRALIZATION 
this end, let &I,. . ,  , am  be arbitrary non-negative scalars. Then we have 
m  m  m  m 
C  a,q(xi) = C  a,gi (xi) = C  aiq(wi) = 9 (C  aiwi) , 
I=  1  i=l  i= 1  i=l 
which tells us that x is an equilibrium and thus an Edgeworth equilibrium. 
Therefore, by assumption x is a Walrasian equilibrium for some non-zero price n E  Li,  which 
is clearly strictly positive.  We  can assume without loss of  generality that n(w) = q(w).  Clearly, 
n(xi) = n(wi) = gi(x,). By Lemma 12 it must be the case that IT 2 gi for each i and thus n > q. 
Finally, notice that from the inequality  IT  > q =  p + h we  get n -  h 2  p > 0. Moreover, from 
(T -  h)(w) = (q -  h)(w) = p(w) > 0 and the fact that if y  C  L+  satisfies p(y)  > p(w), then 
(n -  h)(y) 2 q(y) -  h(y) = p(y)  > p(w)  = (T -  h)(w), it follows that  IT  -  h  supports the set 
(y  E  L+: p(y) > p(w) at w.  Therefore, by part (1) of  Lemma 19, we  see that p is pointwise proper 
at w.  I 
Let us move on to the second welfare theorem.  We  begin by  introducing one more notion of 
pointwise properness for prices. 
Definition 27.  We  say that a price of  the form p = Vzl fi is w-scalable  at x E A if  there exist 
multipliers XI, .  . .  ,  Am  satisfying 0  < Xi 5 1 for each i such that: 
(1)  the allocation x is an optimizer for the new price  = Vzn=,  Xi  fi,  and 
(2)  the price q es  pointwise proper at w. 
Now  we can state and prove the main result of  this section. It presents necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the Walrasian decentralization of  optimal allocations. 
Theorem 28.  In the set of  proper economies E(L, w)  the following statements are equivalent: 
(a) Every price  of  the form p = Vz1 fi with  each fi  strictly positive is w-scalable at each of 
its non-trivial  optimizers. 
(b) Every non-trivial Pareto optimal allocation is a Walrasian valuation equilibrium. 
Proof.  (a) ===+  (b) Let x = (xl,. . . ,  x,)  be a non-trivial Pareto optimal allocation for some econ- 
omy in E(L, w). From parts (1) and (3) of  Theorem 16 this allocation is supported as a valuation 
equilibrium by a price p = Vzl  fi for which x is an optimizer.  So, we  have p(w) = ELl  pi(xd) = 
EZJi(xi).  Since p(xi) 2  fi(x,) for each i, it follows that p(xi) = f,(xi) for each i. Furthermore, 
the proof of  [12, Theorem 5.1 (I)] shows that the functions  fa  can be chosen in such a way that 
each fj (strictly) supports Pi(~i)  at x,, i.e., y E Pi(xi) implies fi(y) > fi(xi). 
We  need to show that each fi is strictly positive.  From p(w) = C:l  fi(x$) > 0 it must be the 
case that f, (zj) > 0 for some j. Notice that if z  E  P, (xj) and fj(z) =  fj(xj), then f, (az) < f, (x,) 
for all a!  < 1; which is impossible since Pj has open values in some linear topology on L. Therefore, 
for z > 0, it must be the case that f,(xj +  z) > fJ(xj),  which implies that fj(z) > 0.  This in turn 
implies that fj  and p are strictly positive, which further implies that fi(x,) =  p(x,) > 0 for each 
i. By the same argument we  see that each fi is strictly positive. 
Now  by our assumption there exist scalars A1, . .  . ,  Am  with 0 < Xi 5 1 for each i such that x 
remains an optimizer of the price q = Vzl  Xi fi that is pointwise proper at the point w. 
Next, we  shall show that q also supports the allocation x as a valuation equilibrium.  Clearly, 
q(x,) >_  A, f,(xi) for each i and since x is an optimizer for q we  have PRICE  DECENTRALIZATION  17 
Consequently, for each i we  have q(xi) =  A, fi(x,) and Czl  q(xi) = q(w) > 0.  Now  if  z E Pi(xi), 
then q(z) 2 A, fi(~)  > Xi fi(x,) = q(x%),  and this shows that q supports x as a valuation equilibrium. 
Now  the validity of  (b) follows from part (1) of Lemma 21. 
(b) ===+  (a) Assume that (b) is true and let  an allocation x = (xl,. .  .  ,x,)  be a non-trivial 
optimizer for a price p = Vzl f, with each fi strictly positive. 
Next, we consider an economy with m consumers, total endowment w, and utility functions given 
by  the strictly positive linear functionals fi. Thus, the preference correspondence Pi :  L+ -+  L+ 
of consumer i is defined by  P,(y) = {x  E L+:  fi(x) > fi(9)). Clearly, this economy is w-proper 
and since x is an optimizer it is Pareto optimal.  So, according to our hypothesis, there exists a 
non-zero price n  E L;  that supports x as a valuation equilibrium.  That is, if  z  E  L+ satisfies 
fi(z) > f,(xi), then n(z) > n(x;).  By the strict positivity of  f, we  see that f,(2xi) > f;(zi) and 
SO 2~(~i)  > T(x~),  Consequently, n(xi) > 0 holds for each i.  Without loss of  generality we  can 
assume that 0 < ~(x;)  < f,(z,)  also holds for each i. 
Now for each i let A.  =  and note that 0 c  Ai < 1. For each i consider the strictly positive 
linear  functional  g,  = Xi  fi.  Observe that g;(x,) = ~(3;)  for each i.  Moreover, if  some vector 
3  E  L+ satisfies g,(z) = gi(xi) > 0, or fi(z) = ft(x2),  then fi(6z) > ft(~i)  for all 6 > 1 and so 
Gn(a) > n(x,)  for all 6 > 1, from which it follows that n(x) 2 n(x,) = g,(xi).  Now  a glance at 
Lemma 12 guarantees that n 2 g,  for each i.  This implies n 2 Vz1 gi, and so from 
we  see that (xl,.  . .  ,xm)  is an optimizer for Vzl g;  and that n(w) = [VEl ggd]  (w) > 0. 
Now  if  an arbitrary vector  z  E  L+  satisfies [Vzn=,  gi] (2)  > [VLl  g,](w),  then we  have the 
inequalities  n(z) > [VEX  g,] (z) > [Vgl  gal  (w) = n(w).  This shows that n  supports the set 
{z E L+ : [Vzl  g,] (z) > [VLl  9.1  (w)) at w and from this and part (a) of  Lemma 19, we  see that 
the price Vzl gi is pointwise proper at w.  H 
We  conclude this section by showing that the existence of an equilibrium implies that prices are 
w-scalable at each of  their non-trivial optimizers. 
Theorem 29.  If  for each  economy in E(L, w)  there mists a  Walrasian equilibrium,  then every 
price p = VEl fi with  each fi strictly positive is w-scalable at each of  its noa-trivial optime'zers, 
Proof.  Let an allocation x = (XI,.  . . ,  x,)  be a non-trivial optimizer for  a price p = VEl f, with 
each fi strictly positive.  Consider an economy with  rn consumers, initial endowments w, = xi 
for each 2, and utility functions given by  the strictly positive linear functionals fi. Clearly, this 
economy is w-proper. 
According to our  hypothesis,  there exists  a Walrasian  equilibrium y = (91, . .  . ,  y,)  for this 
economy supported by  non-zero price n  E  L;.  Since y is individually rational and since x is an 
optimizer for the price p and fi(y,) 2 fi(w,)  = fi(z,) holds for each i it must be the case that 
fi(y,) = f,(xi) for each i.  Since n(y,) = n(wi) = ~(x,)  for each i, we  see that if  z  E L+ satisfies 
fi(z) > fi(za), then n(z) > n(x,).  It is now easy to follow the proof of  Theorem 28 and show that 
p is w-scalable at x. . PRICE DECENTRALIZATION  18 
6. PROPERNESS  OF  PRICES IN  FINANCIAL  MODELS 
The previous theorems demonstrate that we need some pointwise properness of  prices if we  are 
to derive the Walrasian value theory. We start with an example that guarantees the w-properness 
of  prices in P. 
Recall that in our model of  portfolio trading we  have two spaces linked by the portfolio returns 
operator as follows: 
(1) The portfolio space L is ordered by the portfolio dominance ordering. 
(2) The space of  contingent claims X is a Banach lattice. 
(3) The portfolio returns operator R: L C)  X is one-to-one and positive and pulls back order 
intervals of  the marketed space M to closed and bounded dominance intervals of  L. 
Here is an example of  our finance model with an w-proper price space. 
Example 1. Let L =  E2  and X = La[O, 11  and consider the operator R: L -+ X defined on the 
basic vectors el,  ea, . .  . of E2 by 
(1) R(e1) =  X[i,ll +  X[$,tl, 
(2) R(e2) =  Xit,ll. 
(3) R(e3) =  X[+,L]' and 
(4) R(e,)  = A,x[  I  1  I  for each n > 4, where the scalars A,  satisfy  A,  > 0 and they are 
n+2 '  n+l 
appropriately chosen so that R is indeed an operator from E2  to L2[0,1]. 
As usual, if  (al,  a2, .  .  *)  E 4,  then we  have 
Clearly, the operator R is one-to-one and positive (and hence continuous). 
It should not be difficult to see that if  A,  = 1  for each n 2 4, then the operator R is not bounded 
below. On the other hand if  A,  = d(n  + l)(n  +  2) for each n 2 4, then the operator R is bounded 
below.  In fact, it is easy to verify that when  A,  = 1 for each n > 4 the operator R satisfies the 
following properties: 
(a) As in every model, the portfolio dominance cone on E2  is closed and generating.  Moreover, 
R pulls back order intervals of  M to closed and bounded dominance intervals in L. 
(b) The portfolio dominance ordering on L is not a lattice ordering. 
(c)  The price space P is w-proper for every positive portfolio w E L+. 
Therefore our results on linear decentralization apply to this example. 
Let M' be the dual space of  the marketed space M and assume that R is bounded below. Then 
considering R: L -+ M as an order isomorphism, we  see that its adjoint R': M' -+ L',  defined via 
the duality identity 
(R'(f ),  m) = (f  7 R(m)) = f (~(m)) 
for  all m  E  M and all f  E M', is also an order isomorphism.  This operator  associates each 
state dependent price system with a securities price.  We  call this operator the securities prices 
operator. 
We  conclude the paper  with  the following very useful  characterization of  pointwise proper 
prices in terms of  a solution to a linear  minimization  problem.  Its proof  follows immediately 
from Lemma 20. PRICE  DECENTRALIZATION  19 
Theorem 30. Assume that order intervals of L are weakly compact and that the payoff  operator R 
is bounded from  below.  Let fi, . . .  ,  f,  E  LL  and w > 0 be  such that the price p = Vzn=,  fi  satisfies 
p(w) > 0.  Then the following  three conditions are equivalent: 
(1) The price p  is pointwise proper  at w. 
(2)  There exists a solution to the follow2ng  linear minimization problem: 
ming(R(w)) subject to:  gEM' and R1(g)  2 fi  for  all  i=l,.,.,m. 
(3)  There exists a solution to the following  linear minimization problem: 
min h(R(w)) subject to:  h  E  X'  and R'  (h)  >_  fa  for  all  i = 1,  . . . ,  rn, 
where now R'  denotes the adjoint of  the operator R:  L +  X 
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